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The	  common	  understanding	  of	  war	  is	  that	  it	  has	  a	  clear	  beginning	  and	  endpoint	  so	  that	  wartime	  
is	  a	  discrete	  and	  exceptional	  period	  of	  time	  that	  disrupts	  normal	  time	  as	  peacetime.	  Thus,	  when	  
war	  ends,	  peacetime	  returns	  and	  peacetime	  predates	  wartime.	  	  In	  War	  Time,	  Mary	  L.	  Dudziak	  
discusses	  how,	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  United	  States,	  this	  common	  understanding	  is	  inaccurate	  and	  
distorts	   its	  historical	   social	   reality.	   	   In	  Dudziak’s	  view,	  we	  are	   (and	   long	  have	  been)	   living	   in	  a	  
time	  of	  continuous	  war,	  and	  in	  the	  conclusion	  of	  her	  short	  book	  she	  argues	  that	  the	  only	  way	  to	  
begin	  the	  recovery	  of	  the	  political	  space	  lost	  by	  the	  typical	  liberty-­‐restricting	  emergency	  politics	  
of	  war	   is	   to	  see	  “war’s	  presence	  as	  an	  ongoing	   feature	  of	  American	  democracy”	   (136).	  Or,	  as	  
she	  puts	  it	  in	  her	  introduction,	  progressive	  politics	  requires	  that	  we	  recognize	  that	  “wartime	  is	  
the	  only	  time	  we	  have”	  (8).	  	  	  
	   The	  Second	  World	  War	  may	  seem	  to	   illustrate	   the	   idea	   that	  wartime	   is	  a	  definite	  and	  
exceptional	  period	  of	   time.	  The	  United	  States	  was	  attacked	  on	  December	  7,	  1942,	  and	   Japan	  
signed	   surrender	   documents	   on	   September	   2,	   1945.	   	   But,	   Dudziak	   argues,	   to	   locate	   the	  war	  
between	   these	   two	   dates	   would	   be	   an	   error	   because	   the	   Second	   World	   War	   already	  
significantly	   determined	   American	   society	   several	   years	   before	   Pearl	   Harbor,	   notably	   in	   the	  
form	  of	   increased	   exercise	   of	   presidential	   powers,	   expansion	   of	   the	   production	   and	   trade	   of	  
weapons,	   wider	   federal	   surveillance,	   and	   increased	   prosecution	   of	   (with	   broadened	  
understanding	   of	  what	   counts	   as)	   national	   security	   violations.	   	   Similarly,	   Dudziak	  writes	  with	  
regard	  to	  the	  official	  end	  to	  hostilities	  on	  September	  2,	  1945:	  “But	  the	  power	  of	  war	  could	  not	  
quite	  be	  extinguished	  with	  a	   signature.	  The	  United	  States	  began	   to	  demobilize,	  but	   the	  draft	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would	   persist,	   and	   a	   legal	   state	   of	  war,	   enabling	   the	   use	   of	   government	  war	   powers,	  would	  
endure	  for	  several	  years”	  (61).	  
	   According	  to	  Dudziak,	  then,	  wartime	  begins	  when	  anticipated	  hostilities	  impact	  law	  and	  
politics,	   and	   it	   continues	   as	   long	   as	   the	   law	   and	   politics	   engendered	   by	   the	   actual	   hostilities	  
prevail,	   even	   after	   the	   cessation	   of	   combat.	   So	  while	   the	   time	  of	   actual	   hostilities	  may	   have	  
specific	  dates,	  wartime	  has	  no	  “tidy	   time	  boundaries”	   (36).	   	  Broadening	  Dudziak’s	  concept	  of	  
wartime	   a	   bit,	   we	   can	   argue	   that	   war	   impacts	   not	   only	   law	   and	   politics,	   but	   also	   material	  
production	  and	  culture,	  and,	  accordingly,	   that	  we	  are	   in	  wartime	  as	   long	  as	  war	   (anticipated,	  
actual,	  or	  remembered)	  sets	  the	  direction	  and	  tone	  of	  all	  these	  social	  processes.	  
	   For	   Dudziak,	   the	   main	   problem	   with	   viewing	   wartime	   as	   a	   discrete	   period	   of	   actual	  
hostilities	   is	   that	   it	   enables	   us	   to	   misconstrue	   much	   of	   American	   history	   and	   mistakenly	  
anticipate	  our	  future	  as	  one	  of	  peacetime.	  She	  writes:	  “Built	  into	  the	  very	  essence	  of	  our	  idea	  of	  
wartime	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  war	  is	  temporary.	  The	  beginning	  of	  a	  war	  is	  the	  opening	  of	  an	  
era	   that	  will,	  by	  definition,	  come	  to	  an	  end”	   (5).	   	   Looking	  at	   the	  past,	  we	   focus	  on	  the	  major	  
wars	  and	  construe	  the	  other	  times	  as	  peacetime.	  	  Accordingly,	  “it	  is	  only	  through	  forgetting	  the	  
small	  wars	  that	  so	  much	  of	  American	  history	  is	  remembered	  as	  peacetime”	  (31).	  	  Once	  we	  take	  
an	  accurate	   look	  at	  American	  conflicts	  over	   the	  past	   century,	  however,	   it	  becomes	  clear	   that	  
peacetime	  has	  been	  the	  exception.	   	  Dudziak	  visualizes	   this	   fact	  by	  mapping	  all	   the	  years	   that	  
American	   soldiers	   could	   receive	   “campaign	   medals”	   during	   the	   twentieth	   century.	   Her	   map	  
shows	  very	  few	  years	  when	  this	  opportunity	  was	  not	  available,	  and,	  typically,	  in	  any	  given	  year,	  
several	   theatres	  of	   conflict	  would	  offer	   this	  opportunity,	   especially	   in	   the	  post-­‐Second	  World	  
War	  era	  (29).	   	  We	  should	  conclude,	  then,	  that	  for	  the	  United	  States,	   in	  the	  words	  of	  Dudziak,	  
“war	  is	  not	  an	  exception	  to	  normal	  peacetime,	  but	  instead	  an	  enduring	  condition”	  (5).	  	  
	   Dudziak	  further	  supports	  this	  conclusion	  on	  basis	  of	  her	  analysis	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  the	  
Global	  War	  on	  Terror.	   	  All	   in	  all,	  the	  Cold	  War	  era	  was	  a	  period	  of	  wartime,	  not	  only	  because	  
actual	   hostilities	   were	   common	   during	   this	   period,	   often	   at	   the	   periphery	   of	   the	   zone	   of	  
American	  influence.	  	  It	  was	  a	  period	  of	  wartime	  also	  because	  foreign	  policy	  became	  thoroughly	  
militarized,	  the	  national	  security	  state	  was	  expanded,	  and	  the	  war	  economy	  became	  ingrained	  
in	  society	  (90-­‐94).	  	  Wartime	  continued	  with	  the	  Global	  War	  on	  Terror,	  but	  Dudziak	  shows	  that	  a	  
trend	   that	  was	   already	  manifest	   during	   the	   Cold	  War	   has	   now	   become	  more	   striking:	   when	  
wartime	   becomes	   permanent	   it	   is	   no	   longer	   distinguishable	   from	   peacetime,	   and	   what	  
facilitates	  its	  continuation	  is	  that	  it	  is	  no	  longer	  fully	  experienced	  as	  wartime.	  	  	  
	   Initially,	   it	  seemed	  that	  9/11	  was	  the	  beginning	  of	  a	  particular	  wartime	  sharply	  distinct	  
from	  peacetime,	  a	   “genuine”	  wartime	   that	   required	   the	  people	   to	  change	   their	   lives	  as	  Pearl	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Harbor	   had	   done	   before.	   	   Presidential	   powers	   increased,	   war	   (indefinitely	   authorized	   by	  
Congress)	  was	  waged	  against	  the	  Taliban	  and	  al-­‐Qaeda,	  federal	  surveillance	  became	  even	  more	  
extensive,	   indefinite	   detention	   emerged,	   and	   “normal”	   law	   was	   further	   suspended	   in	   the	  
approval	  of	  extraordinary	   renditions	  and	   torture.	   	  But,	  unlike	   in	  1941,	  most	  people	  were	  not	  
asked	  to	  really	  change	  their	  lives.	  	  Here	  Dudziak	  cites	  President	  George	  W.	  Bush	  in	  a	  speech	  on	  
homeland	  security	  (November	  8,	  2001)	  as	  praising	  the	  American	  people,	  faced	  with	  the	  threat	  
of	  terrorism,	  for	  “going	  about	  their	  daily	  lives,	  working	  and	  shopping	  and	  playing,	  worshiping	  at	  
churches	   and	   synagogues	   and	  mosques,	   going	   to	   the	  movies	   and	   to	   baseball	   games”	   (134).	  	  	  
Dudziak	   neglects	   mentioning	   that	   Bush	   also	   applauded	   the	   rise	   in	   volunteering	   and	   service	  
careers	   and	   that	   he	   promised	   that	   the	   government	   would	   create	   more	   opportunities	   for	  
citizens	   to	   promote	   public	   safety	   and	   health.	   Still,	   these	   “new	   responsibilities”	   generated	   by	  
9/11	   soon	   waned	   or	   never	   materialized,	   while	   working,	   shopping,	   playing,	   and	   praying	  
continued	  as	   (in	  Bush’s	  words)	   the	   “ultimate	   repudiation	  of	   terrorism.”	   In	  a	  way,	   the	  Obama	  
administration	   made	   matters	   even	   worse	   by	   making	   its	   wartime	   less	   controversial	   and	  
contested.	   	   Dudziak	   writes:	   “As	   war	   goes	   on,	   Americans	   have	   lapsed	   into	   a	   new	   kind	   of	  
peacetime.	   	   It	   is	   not	   a	   time	   without	   war,	   but	   instead	   a	   time	   in	   which	   war	   does	   not	   bother	  
everyday	   Americans”	   (135).	   	   To	   put	   it	   otherwise,	   “alienated	   war”1	   enables	   a	   wartime	   that	  
appears	  as	  a	  normal	  time	  and,	  so,	  as	  peacetime.	  	  
	   Going	  beyond	   the	   time	   frame	  of	  Dudziak’s	  book,	   it	   is	  evident	   that	   the	  current	  Obama	  
administration	   is	   intent	   on	   masquerading	   wartime	   as	   peacetime.	   In	   his	   Second	   Inaugural	  
Address,	  President	  Barack	  Obama	  said	  that	  “We,	  the	  people,	  still	  believe	  that	  enduring	  security	  
and	  lasting	  peace	  do	  not	  require	  perpetual	  war.”	  And	  the	  first	  thing	  that	  he	  noted	  in	  his	  State	  of	  
the	  Union	  Address	  of	  2013	  was	  that	  “after	  a	  decade	  of	  grinding	  war,	  our	  brave	  men	  and	  women	  
in	  uniform	  are	  coming	  home.”	  And	  later	  in	  the	  speech	  Obama	  maintained	  that	  the	  troops	  could	  
stay	  home:	  “Today,	  the	  organization	  that	  attacked	  us	  on	  9/11	  is	  a	  shadow	  of	  its	  former	  self.	  	  It's	  
true,	   different	   al	   Qaeda	   affiliates	   and	   extremist	   groups	   have	   emerged	   -­‐-­‐	   from	   the	   Arabian	  
Peninsula	  to	  Africa.	  	  The	  threat	  these	  groups	  pose	  is	  evolving.	  	  But	  to	  meet	  this	  threat,	  we	  don’t	  
need	   to	   send	   tens	  of	   thousands	  of	  our	   sons	  and	  daughters	  abroad	  or	  occupy	  other	  nations.”	  	  
Clearly,	   the	  misleading	  message	  here	   is	   that	  we	  are	  not	  at	  war	  when	  we	  use	  drone	  strikes	  to	  
eliminate	   terrorists,	   including	   American	   citizens	   affiliated	   with	   groups	   declared	   to	   be	  
“extremist,”	   and	   we	   are	   no	   longer	   living	   in	   war	   times	   when	   the	   troops	   come	   home	   from	  
Afghanistan,	   even	   though	   the	   authorization	   to	   use	   military	   force	   granted	   by	   Congress	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Cheyney	  Ryan,	  The	  Chickenhawk	  Syndrome	  (Lanham:	  Rowman	  &	  Littlefield,	  2009),	  5-­‐7.	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immediately	  after	  9/11	  will	  remain	  in	  effect	  and	  a	  host	  of	  legal	  “emergency”	  measures	  remain	  
effective.	  	  While	  it	  is	  true	  that	  some	  emergency	  measures	  adopted	  by	  the	  Bush	  administration,	  
such	  as	  torture,	  have	  been	  rejected	  by	  the	  Obama	  administration,	  this	  rejection	  has	  not	  led	  to	  
holding	   perpetrators	   accountable,	   making	   it	   easy	   for	   that	   history	   to	   repeat	   itself.	   And,	   of	  
course,	  Obama	  conveniently	  forgot	  to	  mention	  in	  his	  speech	  that	  his	  time	  in	  office,	  described	  as	  
a	  time	  of	  moving	  towards	  “peace,”	  has	   included	  NATO’s	  overthrow	  of	  Gadhafi,	  an	  increase	  of	  
U.S.	   military	   activities	   in	   Africa,	   a	   continued	  military	   build-­‐up	   of	   the	   Asia-­‐Pacific	   region,	   and	  
increased	  force	  projection	  towards	  Iran.	  
	   Dudziak	  describes	  the	  practical	  purpose	  of	  her	  study	  as	  follows:	  “The	  American	  people	  
cannot	  wait	  for	  a	  new	  peacetime	  to	  end	  the	  detentions	  at	  Guantanamo	  or	  to	  rein	  in	  expanded	  
presidential	  war	  power.	  Time	  itself	  will	  not	  wash	  them	  away.	  Wartime	  is	  the	  only	  time	  we	  have,	  
and	   therefore	   is	   a	   time	   within	   which	   American	   politics	   must	   function.”	   (8;	   see	   also	   136).	  
Dudziak	  does	  not	  discuss	  whether	  it	  is	  feasible	  to	  reduce	  or	  even	  eliminate	  the	  legal	  exceptions	  
and	  restrictions	  legitimized	  by	  the	  global	  war	  on	  terrorism	  during	  permanent	  wartime,	  but	  the	  
example	  of	   the	  Cold	  War	  might	  be	   instructive	  here:	   in	   the	  1970s	   significant	   restrictions	  were	  
placed	   on	   domestic	   surveillance	   and	   CIA	   operations	   abroad,	   while	   presidential	   war	   powers	  
were	  also	  curtailed,	  at	  least	  on	  paper.	  	  Conceivably,	  such	  measures	  could	  be	  taken	  today.2	  	  
	   Even	  if	  we	  grant	  this	  possibility,	  it	  leaves	  untouched	  the	  direct	  costs	  of	  American	  wars	  to	  
people	  across	  the	  globe	  as	  well	  as	  the	  destructive	  cultural	  and	  economic	  consequences	  of	  living	  
in	  wartime.	  	  Moreover,	  curtailment	  of	  the	  homeland	  security	  state	  could	  be	  swept	  away	  again	  
once	   something	   occurs	   that	   makes	   the	   sound	   of	   war	   appealing,	   just	   as	   9/11	   swept	   away	  
restraints	  placed	  in	  the	  1970s	  on	  the	  legal	  abuses	  of	  the	  Cold	  War.	  	  To	  be	  sure,	  Dudziak	  warns	  
against	  such	  an	  eventuality	  when	  she	  notes	  that	  the	  people	  are	  frequently	  misled	  by	  appeals	  to	  
wartime	  emergency	  measures,	  and	  the	  historical	  record	  suggests	  that	  citizens	  (including	  many	  
intellectuals)	   will	   continue	   to	   fall	   into	   this	   trap.	   	   Dudziak’s	   concern	   with	   safeguarding	   civil	  
liberties	  and	  restricting	  presidential	  war	  powers	  thus	  raises	  the	  question	  of	  how	  to	  promote	  a	  
radical	   questioning	  by	  Americans	  of	   their	   readiness	   to	   live	   in	  permanent	  wartime	   in	   the	   first	  
place.	  	  
	   This	   is	   a	   difficult	   task.	   Recent	   challenges	   to	   wartime	   without	   shared	   sacrifice	   –	   for	  
example,	   that	   depict	   supporters	   of	   war	   as	   chickenhawks	   or	   that	   condemn	   the	   casualty	   gap	  
between	   rich	   and	   poor	   in	   recent	   conflicts	   –	   run	   into	   the	   problem	   that	   fighting	   wars	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  David	  K.	  Shipler	  raises	  the	  possibility	  in	  “Will	  Obama	  the	  Constitutional	  Lawyer	  Please	  Stand	  Up?,”	  The	  
Nation,	  February	  11,	  2013,	  and	  he	  concludes	  that	  we	  are	  still	  far	  away	  from	  the	  conditions	  of	  relative	  
safety,	  public	  outrage,	  and	  thorough	  and	  impartial	  investigation	  that	  enabled	  success	  at	  the	  time.	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increasingly	  perceived	  as	  a	  job	  with	  the	  voluntary	  adoption	  of	  risk	  of	  harm.3	  The	  ethics	  of	  the	  
market	   now	   pushes	   aside	   the	   ethics	   of	   sacrifice	   and	   national	   solidarity.	   And	   appeals	   to	   self-­‐
interest	   in	   avoiding	   the	   economic	   burden	   of	  military	   hegemony,	   even	   the	   threat	   of	   national	  
insolvency,	  as	  developed	  recently	  by	  Chalmers	  Johnson,4	  run	  into	  the	  problem	  that	  the	  military	  
budget,	  notwithstanding	  its	  huge	  opportunity	  costs,	  remains	  a	  relatively	  small	  part	  of	  the	  GDP.	  	  
Still,	   the	   task	  must	  be	  pursued,	  especially	   for	   the	   sake	  of	   those	   for	  whom	  American	  wartime	  
cannot	  appear	  as	  anything	  other	  than	  wartime.	  	  
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3	  See	  Ryan,	  The	  Chickenhawk	  Syndrome	  and	  Douglas	  L.	  Kriner	  and	  Francis	  X.	  Shen,	  The	  Casualty	  Gap:	  The	  
Causes	  and	  Consequences	  of	  American	  Wartime	  Inequalities	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2010).	  
4	  See,	  for	  example,	  Chalmers	  Johnson,	  Dismantling	  the	  Empire:	  America’s	  Last	  Best	  Hope	  (New	  York:	  
Metropolitan	  Books,	  2010).  
